Abstract: The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is a crucial issue in a highly integrated economic area as the EU. In this paper we study policy cooperation. In particular, we focus on how coalitions among policy-makers are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of output and price.
INTRODUCTION
It is expected that the introduction of the EMU, which implies a common monetary policy and restrictions on fiscal policy at the national level, increases the need for macroeconomic policy cooperation due to the various interactions, spillovers and externalities from national macroeconomic policies. To study the effects of policy cooperation we compare the impact of three alternative policy regimes in a stylized dynamic model of the EMU: (i) noncooperative monetary and fiscal policies, (ii) partial cooperation, and (iii) full cooperation both in symmetric and asymmetric settings where countries differ in structural characteristics, policy preferences and/or bargaining power. We assume that the EMU consists of two (blocks of) asymmetric countries where the European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for monetary policy and where its primary goal is to achieve price stability and to promote economic stabilization (preferably along a growth path) as long as price stability is not endangered. The governments of the two (blocks of) countries are assumed to determine fiscal policy in their countries such that output is stabilized under the restriction that no excessive deficits occur and that prices do not fluctuate too much. The goals of each party (player) that is involved is formalized in a welfare function which she likes to optimize. This setting naturally leads to model the policy coordination problem as a dynamic game in which each player is looking for that strategy which optimizes her welfare.
Based on a model developed by Turnovsky et al. (1988) and Neck and Dockner (1995) , Engwerda et al. (1999) have studied the effects of noncooperative macroeconomic policies. They analyze macroeconomic stabilization among three players in a dynamic model of the EMU. Cooperation has also been analyzed in Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996) , Demertzis et al. (1999) , Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2001) , Engwerda et al. (2001) , and van . Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996) find that asymmetries tend to increase the scope for policy cooperation. In their paper the asymmetric cases display for all players larger gains from cooperation than in the symmetric base scenario. This last result is only partially confirmed in van in the sense that the Hughes Hallett and Ma's (1996) result is confirmed except for the case of asymmetric bargaining powers among players, where it was observed that the stronger the asymmetry in the bargaining powers the less probable policycooperation and coalitions become since policies will be biased towards the needs of the stronger player(s) and the smaller players are less likely to stay in such 'asymmetric' coalitions. Demertzis et al. (1999) illustrate that, at least when (output or inflation) shocks are symmetric, national governments make the largest gains by imposing strong forms of accountability, e.g. inflation targeting. But it is observed that these gains come at the expense of the ECB, and those whose preferences are aligned with the ECB. Accountability can therefore go too far, but some degree of accountability is always desirable for everyone. This result emphasises the obvious attraction of allowing a fiscal coalition to take responsibility for the design of monetary policy, which illustrates the weakness of an independent ECB. Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2001) analyze partial cooperation between a common central bank, trade unions and governments in a monetary union in a static framework. These authors found that, when players' loss functions are distinguished according to different objectives, monetary policy can compensate the governments' actions and neutralize expected coordination benefits of governments, but not those of unions. Engwerda et al. (2001) analyze macroeconomic adjustment under a noncooperative and full cooperative fiscal policy design in the EMU using an open-loop dynamic game approach.
A first analysis of the partial coalition model presented in this paper was already performed by van Aarle et al. in (2001) . The sustainability of a certain type of coalition and its implications for the optimal strategies and the resulting macroeconomic adjustment were seen to be highly sensitive to the initial settings of the preferences and the structural model parameters. They found that cooperation is often efficient for the fiscal players. On the other hand, it was shown that full cooperation of all three players does not always induce a Pareto improvement for the ECB, and that a governments' coalition often implies a considerable loss for the ECB compared to the noncooperative and full cooperative cases. In the cases that the ECB cooperates with one government against the other, it often gains a considerable Pareto-improvement but both governments lose. Therefore, in the experiments done in that paper a kind of dualism arises between the cooperative solutions and the noncooperative one.
In this paper policy-makers facing a stabilization problem play a two-stage game. In the first stagethe coalition game -they decide noncooperatively whether or not to sign an agreement about policycoordination after that an asymmetric price shock has been observed. In the second stage -the stabilization game -they (generally) play the noncooperative Nash game, where the policy-makers who sign the agreement play as a single player sharing a common loss function. This paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the model, whilesection 3 derives the properties of the symmetric solution of the game. Section 4 discusses the different equilibria used for determining the emerging coalitions. Section 5 solves the game numerically and section 6 concludes.
A SIMPLE EMU DYNAMIC MODEL
The economy is represented by a dynamic two country EMU model as in van Aarle et al. (2001) . The model is expressed in deviations from the long term equilibrium (balanced growth path) that has been normalized to zero, for simplicity. The model consists of the following equations:
where y j denotes real output in country j, s competitiveness of country 2 vis-à-vis country 1, p j the price level and f j the real fiscal deficit in country j ∈ {1, 2}, and i E the common nominal interest rate. All variables are in logarithms, except for the interest rate which is in perunages. A dot above a variable denotes its time derivative.
The above equations describe the structure of the two economies where the policy-makers are assumed to have inter-temporal objective functions:
and
where:
We assume that the fiscal authorities control their fiscal policy instrument such as to minimize a quadratic loss function which features domestic inflation, output and fiscal deficit. Preference for a low fiscal deficit reflects the costs of excessive deficits. In both cases the total cost to be minimized is a discounted sum of the costs incurred at each period, with θ denoting the discount rate.
From the structural form of the model, we derive the reduced form by solving for y 1 (t), y 2 (t) anḋ s(t):
where
, 2} and i 6 = j. The last equation denotes the dynamics of the model: it is a first-order linear differential equation. The initial value of the state variable, s 0 , measures any initial disequilibrium in competitiveness. Such an initial disequilibrium in competitiveness could be the result of differences in fiscal policies in the past or some initial supply side disturbance in one country.
, the objectives of the policymakers can be written as 1 :
T 4 e 4 )x(t)} and where e l ∈ < 4 is defined as the unit row vector with the l-th coordinate equal to 1 whereas the remaining values are equal to zero, m i ∈ < 4 is equal to
Henceforth, for reasons of convenience, we assume that t 0 = 0 and θ is equal to zero (if θ differs from zero, the model could be easily solved following the same procedure used in this paper after a simple transformation of variables 2 ).
Indicating with Ω the (set of) policy-makers that form a coalition, the problem that policy-makers face in the stabilization game can be summarized as the minimization of the following loss function: 
for the cooperative policy-makers (where the τ i sum to 1),
subject to the reduced form of the model. The solution of that problem consists of the following optimal controls:
Then, using the above optimal controls we obtain the corresponding fiscal players' optimal costs: 
THE SYMMETRIC SOLUTION
In this section we consider the model described in the previous section under the assumption of symmetry of country 1 and 2. In that case one can obtain theoretical results. Details on calculations can be found in Di Bartolomeo and Plasmans (2001) and in the extended version of this paper. The outcomes of this analysis are not only interesting on their own, but may be also helpful in analyzing the properties of the asymmetric model. We make the following assumptions w.r.t. the various parameters:
, and κ 1 = κ 2 . Furthermore we introduce the following parameters for notational convenience: a := a 1 , e :=
, where τ is some number between 0 and 1 2 , g := χ 1 d , and
. Then, the dynamics are given by the state equatioṅ
The performance criteria reduce to: 
For the cooperative case we assume that the bargaining power coefficients satisfy τ 1 = τ 2 =: τ and τ 3 = 1 − 2τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 2 . The various equilibrium strategies for the noncooperative (nc), the cooperative (c) and the fiscal coalition ((1,2)) cases are given respectively by:
and the corresponding cost for the players is:
for i = nc, c, (1, 2). Here:
where, introducing the following expressions u := 2φ 4 u nc + bφ 1 (3a − e), K nc := . If the coalition (1,3),2 occurs (or its symmetric counterpart (2,3),1) the EMU is directly involved in the game (i.e. the common interest rate differs in general from zero). As a consequence the theoretical formulae become much more involved. Therefore they are omitted here. In the rest of this section we will restrict to the case that e < a and we will assume, moreover, that as well −φ 4 as a are positive. For a broad class of realistic model parameters these assumptions hold. As a consequence, the noncooperative game has a uniquely defined equilibrium (see van Aarle et al. (2001) for details). Furthermore, unless stated otherwise, we will restrict our analysis to the noncooperative and the cooperative cases, and the coalition structure (1,2),3. We observe two striking things: f 1 = −f 2 and the ECB does not influence the game, neither in a direct way (i.e. i E = 0) nor in an indirect way (i.e. via its parameters). These statements do not hold for the coalition form (1,3),2. There, the fiscal instruments differ and the ECB uses its instruments actively to reach its goals. The symmetry assumptions are crucial too: if they are dropped, the ECB also gets actively involved into the game. Since we have explicit formulae for the various cost functions we can exploit these to derive some further general conclusions. Our first observation is that the convergence speed of the closed-loop system satisfies some nice properties.
is a monotonically increasing function with a cl,i (0) = 0 and a cl,i (∞) = −φ 4 , i = nc, c, (1, 2).
2
The proof can be found in van . Note that the cost functions for the fiscal players always coincide. Our next results concern the performance criterion. We will see, amongst others, that the ECB prefers a noncooperative above a cooperative mode of play if the cooperation parameter τ becomes large and that the fiscal players prefer a partial coalition above a cooperative mode of play. Details can again be found in van . We use the notation sgn(a) here to denote the sign of variable a. Introducing the notation J i j to denote the cost of player i in coalition j we have:
ii) J noncooperative case, the costs for the fiscal players will be less in the cooperative mode of play than in the noncooperative case. A similar reasoning shows that, since J i c ≥ J i (1,2) , the cost of the ECB in the coalition (1,2) mode of play will always be larger than in the cooperative case. Stated differently, we see that under this assumption the ECB will always prefer the noncooperative mode of play, whereas the fiscal players prefer the coalition (1,2) mode of play. So, summarizing, we have:
Theorem 3: Assume that the ECB considers the nominal performance criterion. Then, there exists a number τ * such that if τ ≥ τ * , the cooperative mode of play is not internally stable. 2
ENDOGENOUS COALITION FORMATION
In analyzing endogenous coalitions in the first stage of the proposed two-stage game, we restrict our attention to three possible mechanisms of coalition formation: the coalitional Nash equilibrium (CNE), the sequential negotiation equilibrium (SNE), and the farsighted coalitional equilibrium (FCE). These equilibria can be informally described as follows 3 .
A CNE is an equilibrium of a one-shot game where each agent faces the problem of simultaneously accepting or rejecting a proposal that consists in sharing her utility function only by looking at the immediate consequence of her actions. After that all agents' decisions are taken, the CNE is formed. More formally the CNE is characterized by two properties: the profitability (i.e. the coalition losses must be lower than the noncooperative ones for all coalition members) and the stability property (the loss of each coalition member must be lower than the loss of the same policy-maker when she defects from the coalition and the other members do not change their strategies). The stability property guarantees that the equilibrium of it is self-enforcing.
An SNE is an equilibrium of a multi-stage negotiation process that implies hierarchical heterogeneity. The negotiation starts with the proposal of forming a coalition of one agent. The order of agents that can propose a coalition is given by an exogenous rule. Each prospective member can reject or accept the proposal in the order determined by this fixed rule. If one of the policy-makers rejects the proposal, that policy-maker must make a counter-offer. If all members accept, the coalition is formed and then all members of that coalition 3 For form aldeønitions see D iB artolom eo and P lasm ans (2001) and the references in that paper.
withdraw from the negotiations. When all agents exit from the negotiation the SNE is reached.
Several game-theory economists have defined some solution concepts based on the idea of indirect domination. We follow their approach by defining the FCE as an equilibrium of a multi-stage negotiation process of the following kind. At each stage of the negotiation, a current status quo exists, but different coalitions may be proposed and another status quo can be reached since agreements are not binding. The process continues until there is a status quo from which nobody wishes to deviate. At this point an FCE is defined and a binding agreement is signed. The meaning of the different equilibria will be clear after the example proposed in the next section.
NUMERICAL SOLUTION
Parameters are chosen on the basis of reasonable empirical evidence (see Turnovsky et al., 1988; and Neck and Dockner, 1995) . The semi-elasticity of the demand for domestic output with respect to the real interest rate is γ = 0.5, the elasticity of the demand for domestic output with respect to the competitiveness is δ = 1, the elasticity of the demand for domestic output with respect to the foreign output is ρ = 0.3, the elasticity of the demand for domestic output with respect to the fiscal index is η = 1, the Phillips curve coefficient is ξ = 0.75, and the inter-temporal discount factor is θ = 0.15. The initial state of the EMU economy is assumed to be at s 0 = 0.05 (implying an initial disequilibrium of 5 % in competitiveness between the two countries).
In the simulation we focus on the policy-makers' priorities and on their bargaining power distribution. We assume (table 2) that both governments' priority is output (employment) stabilization while the ECB is mainly concerned about price stabilization. In table 2 the following preference weights in the policy-makers' objective functions are assumed: α = 0.5, α E = 0.25, β = 0.25, β E = 0.5 and χ = 0.25. The table reads as follows: the country 1's government chooses rows, the country 2's government chooses columns and the ECB chooses boxes (among A and B). Assuming that a policy-maker prefers to cooperate whenever rational, table 2 describes a Prisoner's dilemma. In fact, in that table the noncooperative strategy d is dominant for each policy-maker. Therefore, the only equilibrium of the game is the noncooperative one. However, it is necessary to look at the different assumptions about the endogenous coalition formation described in the above section. When the CNE is considered, it is easy to check that profitability holds, but internal stability is not satisfied since both governments have an incentive to deviate. The governments' partial coalition is the only CNE since both requirements are satisfied. This partial cooperation result is very common when the CNE is assumed. When FCE is considered the grand coalition becomes stable because the ECB has no interest in deviating while both governments foresee that a deviation behavior will lead them to a position (the partial cooperation between the ECB and one government) that is unstable. Therefore, by comparing their payoffs with the final equilibrium that in that case will emerge (the noncooperative one), they prefer to remain in the grand coalition. Considering the SNE we can observe that for both government it is optimal to have a coalition between the two other policy-makers while the grand coalition or a governments' coalition is a second best choice. For the ECB the grand coalition is at least optimal. Therefore, for each agent, independently from the rule of order, it is optimal to propose the grand coalition and for the other agents it is optimal to accept that proposal. The grand coalition represents the SNE of the game.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied the coalition formation issue and have introduced two further steps into the literature by analyzing how coalitions form under different institutional settings and what are the effects of coalition formation and power distribution on economic policies. We have shown that when the coalition formation game is played without communication among the policy-makers, cooperation is either impossible or limited. However, when the policy-makers can communicate, full cooperation (as well as partial cooperation between a subset of countries) becomes possible in equilibrium, whereas complete noncooperation is not sustainable in equilibrium. This contrast provides broad support for the view that institutions and international forums for discussion can play a crucial role in achieving international cooperation, even when these institutions are not endowed with enforcement powers.
